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1  8 USC  § 1151 et seq. 
2  ibid. 
3  See discussion of fungible workers in text attached to n 121. 
4  ibid. 
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 Immigration, Emigration, 
Fungible Labour and the Retreat 
from Progressive Taxation 
 HENRY ORDOWER 
 With emphasis on the US, this chapter explores the role that taxation plays in the 
movement of people and capital.  e chapter addresses the relationship between 
taxes and retention of capital, including tax incentives for capital investment, shi ing 
tax burdens from capital to labour as progressive taxation wanes, and rules prevent-
ing the escape of capital from its current taxing jurisdiction. Next, the discussion 
moves on to consider how taxes supplement immigration policy to attract capi-
tal currently outside the jurisdiction.  e chapter then queries whether taxes play 
any signi cant role in attracting or retaining skilled labour before identifying how 
tax trends disadvantage  ‘ less desirable ’, fungible, frequently immigrant labour in 
response to anti-immigration and anti-immigrant public sentiment.  e chapter 
concludes by observing a relationship between taxation and the unwillingness of 
societies to help those who culturally, ethnically, racially or religiously di er from the 
bulk of the membership in the society as that society may change from time to time. 
 I. Introduction 
 Family unity has driven US immigration policy for legal, permanent immigra-
tion. 1 Admission categories other than family immigration are  ‘ merit-based ’ even 
within the special category for diversity immigration. 2 Merit criteria assign priority 
to exceptional individuals with critical skills and education. Unskilled, fungible 3
workers are o en admitted seasonally but permanent status is elusive 4    – even 
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5  ND  Schwartz ,  ‘ Washington Wants to Deport Washington ’ s Builders ’,  New York Times ( 15 September 
2019 ) Business 1 (Salvadorans ’ proposed removal). 
6  Bans on immigration from predominantly Muslim countries. US Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS),  ‘ Executive Orders on Protecting the Homeland ’, available at  https://www.dhs.gov/
executive-orders-protecting-homeland (accessed 3 December 2018). 
7  MD  Shear ,  ‘ Trump Immigration Plan Emphasizes Immigrants ’ Skills Over Family Ties ’,   e New 
York Times ( 15 May 2019 ), available at  https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/15/us/politics/trump-
immigration-kushner.html (accessed 17 May 2019). 
8  M  Talev and  Justin  Sink ,  ‘ Trump Looks to  reat of Welfare Bills to Curb Immigration ’,  Bloomberg
( 23 May 2019 ), available at  https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-23/trump-orders-
government-to-collect-bills-for-immigrant-welfare (accessed 24 May 2019). 
9  US Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS), DHS,  Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds , 
 84 FR 41292 ( August 14, 2019 ) (e ective 15 October 2019). 
10  ‘ Green card ’ is the identi cation card that the USCIS issues to immigrants quali ed to reside and 
work permanently in the US. USCIS, DHS,  ‘ Green Card ’, available at  https://www.uscis.gov/greencard 
(accessed 12 September 2019). 
11  8 USC  § 1201(a)(4) (individuals who are likely to become public charges are ineligible to immigrate 
to or remain in the US). 
12  USCIS, DHS and Executive O  ce for Immigration Review ,  Temporary Final Rule, Asylum 
Eligibility and Procedural Modi cations ,  84  FR 33829 ( July 16, 2019 ) . 
13  A  Ahmed and  P  Villegas ,  ‘ “  is Takes Away All Hope ” : Rule Bars Most Applicants for Asylum in 
US ’,  New York Times ( 12 September 2019 ), available at  https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/12/world/
americas/asylum-seekers.html (discussing the Supreme Court decision to remove the lower court 
injunction barring enforcement of the rule). 
14  Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 
establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examin-
ing an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country 
national or a stateless person (29 June 2013), available at  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/?uri=CELEX:32013R0604 (accessed 7 September 2019). 
those holding work permits under temporary asylum status may face removal 
from the US. 5
 Despite the apparent national origin-based immigration policy advanced 
early in President Trump ’ s administration, 6 recent immigration policy emphasises 
economic rather than cultural or religious distinctions. 7 Consistent with merit- 
and economic contribution-based immigration, the President has instructed 
federal agencies to enforce a longstanding, but historically unenforced, require-
ment that sponsors of immigrants reimburse governmental expenditures on 
behalf of sponsored immigrants, including healthcare and welfare payments. 8 A 
new regulation 9 denies  ‘ green cards ’ 10 to lawful immigrants on the basis that they 
are  ‘ public charges ’ 11 when they claim public bene ts. 
 Economic immigration restrictions also underlie an interim  nal rule 12
precluding asylum seekers from applying for US asylum if they pass through a 
third country without applying for and being denied asylum in that country. 13  e 
rule is comparable to the EU priority for asylum application in the  rst country of 
entry. 14 A grant of admission and asylum permits the asylum seeker to move freely 
throughout the EU. Most US asylum seekers come from Central American coun-
tries, are economically stressed, and travel over land through Mexico. If granted 
asylum in Mexico, they have no right of admission to the US. 
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15  Miriam  Jordan ,  ‘ Letters From Washington: Your Employees Could Be Undocumented ’ 
New York Times ( 16 May 2019 ), available at  https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/16/us/immigrants-
undocumented-no-match.html (accessed 17 May 2019).  e policy of sending  ‘ no match letters ’ was 
suspended from 2012 to 2019. 
16  Chinese labourers ’ contribution to building the transcontinental railroad in the US was not 
celebrated until the 150th anniversary in 2019.  J  Katz ,  ‘  e Transcontinental Railroad Wouldn ’ t 
Have Been Built Without the Hard Work of Chinese Laborers ’ ( 2010 )  Smithsonian Magazine , 
available at  https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-institution/transcontinental-railroad-
chinese-labourers-180971919/#d40bEvGCK1RTcGYh.99 (accessed 25 May 2019);  GH  Chang ,  Ghosts 
of Gold Mountain  e Epic Story of the Chinese Who Built the Transcontinental Railway ( Boston MA , 
 Houghton Mi  in Harcourt ,  2019 ) . 
17  Call centres for product support or marketing are examples, while technological services lend 
themselves to remote contact between clients and providers. 
18  Y  Brauner ,  ‘ Brain Drain Taxation as Development Policy ’ ( 2010 )  55  Saint Louis University Law 
Journal  221 ;  M  Lister ,  ‘A Tax-Credit Approach to Addressing Brain Drain ’ ( 2017 )  62  Saint Louis 
University Law Journal  63 . 
  e Social Security Administration sends  ‘ no match letters ’ to employers of low 
wage immigrants in industries that may employ unauthorised workers notifying 
them that some employees ’ names do not match their social security numbers. 15
 e notices do not require employers to take action but exert implicit pressure 
to screen for unauthorised workers. Employers may dismiss workers rather than 
investing the time and expense to correct possible errors. 
 Historically, immigration was a key source of much-needed labour in growing 
economies.  e US was built by immigrants and guest workers, who sometimes 
were denied permanent residence and whose contributions were not always 
acknowledged. 16 European countries relied heavily on guest workers from the 
mid-twentieth century to the earlier twenty- rst century, o en without granting 
the workers the right to reside permanently or to become citizens. 
 In the twenty- rst century, con ict zones and weak economies drive immigra-
tion from those areas to wealthier and more stable areas, while high taxes and 
regulation fuel emigration from wealthy stable economies to lower tax, less regu-
lated jurisdictions. Labour  ight to lower tax jurisdictions historically has not 
been prevalent because rendition of services was location dependent.  e rapid 
growth of technology, however, has made many industries independent of the 
location of their service providers. 17 Cross-border competition for some labour 
has grown. 
 While top scientists and medical professionals have been in demand since 
the early years of the twentieth century, demand for technology expertise has 
accompanied growing international reliance on technology.  e emergence of 
English as the international technical language has removed linguistic barriers to 
commerce. Individuals with technical expertise are able to work remotely or relo-
cate. Competition in many realms has become international. Developing countries 
which devoted their limited resources to training their citizens to develop techni-
cal skills are concerned those educated individuals may move to countries o ering 
higher salaries and better living circumstances. 18
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19  DA  Brown ,  ‘ Teaching Civil Rights through the Basic Tax Course ’ ( 2010 )  54  Saint Louis University 
Law Journal  809 , 813 – 15 (blacks receive fewer tax bene ts from home ownership because they tend to 
be renters). 
20  See nn 121 – 143 and accompanying text. 
21  Cf  H  Ordower ,  ‘ Taxing Others in the Age of Trump: Foreigners (and the Politically Weak) as Tax 
Subjects ’ ( 2017 )  62  Saint Louis University Law Journal  157 (discussing tax elements disadvantaging 
lower income immigrants). 
22  PR  Dukmedjian and  N  Girleanu ,  ‘ Luxembourg O ers Tax Incentives to Attract Highly 
Skilled Employees ’,  Tax Notes ( 6 December 2018 ), available at  https://www.taxnotes.com/
worldwide-tax-daily/employment-taxes/luxembourg-offers-tax-incentives-attract-highly-skilled-
employees/2018/12/06/28l6b (accessed 1 October 2019). 
23  See n 18 for literature examples. 
24  Brown (n 19). 
25  NC  Staudt ,  ‘ Taxing Housework ’ ( 1995 – 1996 )  84  Georgetown Law Journal  1571 . 
26  H  Ordower ,  ‘ Schedularity in US Income Taxation and its E ect on Tax Distribution ’ ( 2014 )  108 
Northwestern University Law Review  905 . 
 Whatever the reasons one chooses to emigrate, the immigrant expects equal 
and fair treatment by the receiving country. Tax burden distribution in the US 
discriminates somewhat against people of colour 19 and low wage immigrants. 20
Yet immigration has been largely absent from tax policy debate. 21 With emphasis 
on the US, this chapter inquires whether the taxation system provides fair treat-
ment to all immigrant taxpayers or favours some immigrants over others. 
  is chapter  rst reviews the question of tax fairness in the distribution of tax 
burdens and whether tax structure discriminates against or favours taxpayers with 
di ering characteristics.  e chapter then addresses the relationship between taxes 
and retention of capital, including tax incentives for capital investment, shi ing 
tax burdens from capital to labour, and rules preventing the escape of capital from 
its current taxing jurisdiction.  e section following considers how taxes supple-
ment immigration policy to attract capital currently outside the jurisdiction. Next, 
the discussion contemplates whether taxes play any signi cant role in attracting 22
or retaining skilled labour. 23  e  nal portion looks at taxes and tax trends and 
identi es how they disadvantage or bene t fungible labourers who o en are immi-
grants and then concludes. 
 II. Tax Fairness: From Progressivity to Regressivity 
 One fundamental principle of tax fairness  –  ‘ horizontal equity ’  – requires the tax 
law to treat like taxpayers alike. US tax law is racially neutral on its face. While no 
discriminatory intent manifests itself in tax legislative history and strong public 
policy principles preclude enactment of expressly racist legislation, critical tax 
scholars have identi ed provisions of the US tax law that discriminate racially 24
or sexually. 25 Advantageous treatment of investment income favours higher 
income taxpayers. 26 Wealthy and high income taxpayers capture most charitable 
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27  H  Ordower ,  ‘ Charitable Contributions of Services: Charitable Gi  Planning for Non-Itemizers ’ 
( 2014 )  67  Tax Lawyer  517 . Cf  JJ   orndike ,  ‘ Tax History: Charity Deductions Are for the Rich  – and 
 at Was Always the Plan ’ ( 2019 )  164  Tax Notes  1856 . 
28  US Dept of Commence, Census Bureau,  2012 Statistical Abstract , Section 13. Income, Expenditures, 
Poverty, and Wealth,  Table 697 .  ‘ Money Income of Households  – Percent Distribution by Income Level, 
Race, and Hispanic Origin, in Constant (2009) Dollars ’, available at  https://www2.census.gov/library/
publications/2011/compendia/statab/131ed/tables/12s0697.pdf?# (accessed 4 May 2020). 
29   e top marginal rate of tax in the US was 92% in 1952. Tax Foundation,  ‘ US Federal Individual 
Income Tax Rates History, 1862–2013 (Nominal and In ation-Adjusted Brackets) ’ [31], available at 
 https://taxfoundation.org/us-federal-individual-income-tax-rates-history-1913-2013-nominal-and-
in ation-adjusted-brackets/ (accessed 15 September 2019). Similarly, high marginal rates were 
prevalent or soon to be so in most European countries not in the Soviet sphere of in uence. 
30  WJ Blum and H Kalven Jr,  ‘  e Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation ’ (1952) 19  University of 
Chicago Law Review 417. 
31  ibid 419. 
32  ibid 520. 
33  ibid 444. 
34  SO  Lodin ,  ‘ Swedish Tax Reforms 1971–77  – Why So Many ? ’ ( 1977 )  56  Acta Universitatis 
Stockholmiensis Studia Juridica Stockholmiensia  181 . 
contribution tax bene ts. 27 Among higher income taxpayers who enjoy tax expen-
ditures, racial minorities are underrepresented. 28
 During the middle part of the twentieth century, a progressive income tax 
became a principal revenue source in advanced democracies. 29 Progressivity in 
taxation became the second fundamental principle of tax fairness:  ‘ vertical equity ’. 
 e principle assumes that as an individual ’ s income or wealth increases, the indi-
vidual ’ s ability and responsibility to pay tax increases disproportionally. In their 
seminal article on progressive taxation, 30 professors Blum and Kalven catalogued 
arguments for progressivity observing that regressive taxation is anathema to fair 
distribution of the tax burden and lacks support:  ‘ [i]t is so clear no one today 
favors any tax because it is regressive that the term itself has become colored ’. 31
 ey concluded that smoothing economic inequality through redistribution of 
wealth is the strongest justi cation for progressive taxation, 32 understanding that 
 ‘ the drawbacks of progression in terms of productivity must be weighed against its 
possible merits in allocating the tax burden fairly ’. 33
 Despite its foundation in horizontal and vertical equity principles, basic tax 
structure tilted toward proportional and regressive taxes during the latter half 
of the twentieth century under the pressures of political in uence of wealth and 
growing governmental revenue needs. A progressive income tax was di  cult 
to collect e  ciently and its high marginal rates imposed on mostly middle-
income individuals from whom the state had to collect the bulk of its revenue 
were unpopular. 34 Legislatures sought other sources of revenue, especially in the 
welfare states of Northern Europe where less progressive and even regressive taxes 
emerged to carry the welfare state burden. Chief among those regressive taxes was 
value added tax (VAT). 
 VAT is somewhat hidden because the tax is built into the cost of goods and 
services. Taxpayer liquidity concerns of income taxes are absent because its inclu-
sion in the price leaves the consumer a choice to pay the tax or not buy the item. 
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35  Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, 
available at  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:347:0001:0118:en:PDF 
(accessed 15 September 2019). Exemptions and reduced rates are not uniform throughout the EU. 
36  M  Friedman ,  ‘ Transfer Payments and the Social Security System ’ ( 1965 )  11   e Conference Board 
Record  7 . 
37  Compare the US shi  to merit based immigration: see text at n 7 above. 
38  L  Adim ,  ‘ Between Bene t and Abuse: Immigrant Investment Programs ’ ( 2017 )  62  Saint Louis 
University Law Journal  121 ;  A  Christians ,  ‘ Buying In: Residence and Citizenship by Investment ’ ( 2017 ) 
 62  Saint Louis University Law Journal  51 (both articles discussing  ‘ golden visas ’ for investors). 
VAT has been so popular that the EU harmonised VAT taxation at a minimum rate 
of 15 per cent. 35
 For many moderate- and middle-income taxpayers, income from wages is their 
signi cant source of income. Since those taxpayers consume most of their wages 
for living expenses subject to VAT, VAT is e ectively a tax on labour. VATs tend to 
be regressive because the lower the individual ’ s income and wealth, the more the 
individual must dedicate their limited resources to basic living expenses subject 
to VAT. By contrast wealthier taxpayers devote signi cant amounts of income and 
wealth to investment rather than consumer purchases. Since purchases of intan-
gible investment property such as corporate shares and bonds are not subject to 
VAT, income devoted to such investments remains free from VAT. 
 VAT rates have increased and income tax rates have declined over the last 
half century. Taxes on income from investment have declined disproportionally 
to taxes on income from personal services while supplemental wage taxes have 
grown. Frequently the wage taxes are indirect taxes that are imposed upon the 
employer but probably borne by employees in the form of lower wages than they 
otherwise might receive if there were no tax. 36
 Retreat from progressive taxation is an international trend that coincides with 
changing immigration patterns and increasing need to accept diverse refugee 
populations. Some immigrants will  nd work and invest capital and begin to pay 
income taxes quickly; others may not. Rules governing admission of immigrants 
to stable, developed countries try to anticipate income productivity. 37 Even if they 
di er ethnically, racially and religiously from the majority populace, wealthy and 
highly educated immigrants receive favourable admission decisions from immi-
gration authorities more frequently than do con ict and economic refugees. 38
 Progressive taxation of the mid-twentieth century yielded to proportional and 
even regressive taxation in the twenty- rst century as the burden of taxation shi ed 
from capital to labour. While capital mobility can account for the shi  from taxing 
capital to taxing labour, immigration also may have contributed to that shi . 
 III. Retaining Rich People and their Capital 
 Professor Winters argues that civil oligarchs use their wealth to in uence tax system 
changes that reduce progressive taxes and substitute regressive ones. He sees the 
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39  JA  Winters ,  ‘ Civil Oligarchies ’ in  JA  Winters ,  Oligarchy ( Cambridge ,  CUP ,  2011 ) ch 5 (distinguish-
ing oligarchs from the merely wealthy and demonstrating that the extremely wealthy oligarchs bear an 
ever decreasing share of the tax burden in the US). 
40  A  Alstads æ ter ,  N  Johannesen and  G  Zucman ,  ‘ Tax Evasion and Inequality ’ ( 2019 )  109  American 
Economic Review  2073 (using leaked data showing that o shore tax evasion is highly concentrated 
among the rich in Scandinavia and highlighting the importance of factoring in tax evasion to properly 
measure inequality). 
41  H  Ordower ,  ‘  e Culture of Tax Avoidance ’ ( 2010 )  55  Saint Louis ULJ  47 . 
42  Ordower (n 41); Alstads æ ter, Johannesen and Zucman (n 40) (current lower than historical rates 
under Scandinavian income taxes do not stop o shore tax avoidance or evasion by wealthy taxpayers). 
43  26 USC  § 1(h) (imposing a reduced rate of tax to net capital gain relative to the rate imposed on 
income of other types). Unlike the federal income tax that applies a reduced income tax rate to net 
capital gain, state income taxes generally apply an identical rate to net capital gain as they apply to 
income of all other types. State income taxes vary considerably from state to state and add an addi-
tional tax of as much as 3% in Indiana or 13% in California, for example, using 2019 rates.  K  Loughead 
and  E  Wei ,  ‘ State Individual Income Tax Rates and Brackets for 2019 ’ ( Tax Foundation Fiscal Fact No. 
643 ,  2019 ), available at  https:// les.taxfoundation.org/20190515164552/State-Individual-Income-Tax-
Rates-and-Brackets-for-2019-FF-643.pdf (accessed 29 May 2019). 26 USC is the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986, as amended (the  ‘ Code ’ ). In the following, sections of the Code will be referred to as  ‘ IRC 
 § ’ followed by a number. 
44  Citizens for Tax Justice ,  ‘ Payroll Tax Loophole Used by John Edwards and Newt Gingrich 
Remains Unaddressed by Congress ’ ( 6 September 2013 ), available at  https://www.ctj.org/payroll-tax-
loophole-used-by-john-edwards-and-newt-gingrich-remains-unaddressed-by-congress/ (accessed 
17 September 2019). 
45  Consider the Beatles and their tax moves described in  N  Irwin ,  ‘  e Beatles were the Mitt Romney 
of the 1960s, and other policy lessons from the Fab Four ’,   e Washington Post Blog ,  10 January 2014 , 
available at  http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/01/10/the-beatles-were-the-
mitt-romney-of-the-1960s-and-other-policy-lessons-from-the-fab-four/ . Under a territorial system, 
taxpayers who are not resident in the taxing jurisdiction are subject to tax only on their incomes from 
sources in the taxing jurisdiction and not on their income from performance of services outside the 
taxing jurisdiction.  e US taxes its citizens and permanent residents on their worldwide income so 
US taxpayers must relinquish their citizenship or green cards to free themselves from the US income 
tax. 26 CFR  § 1.1-1. 
reduction of the maximum marginal income tax rate to be a result of oligarchi-
cal activity in order to gain anti-progressive taxation allies by including increased 
numbers of the wealthy but not obscenely wealthy as allies against progressive 
taxes by pushing them into the highest marginal brackets. 39 Alternative or addi-
tional forces driving a retreat from progressive taxation may have been growing 
tax avoidance and the international focus on retaining wealthy taxpayers in the 
face of international competition for their capital 40 and their skills. 
 High marginal income tax rates arguably encourage taxpayers to engage in 
aggressive tax planning.  e tax sheltering industry in the US developed during 
the years of high marginal rates of income tax. 41 Yet, taxpayers o en try to avoid 
even low rate taxes too. 42 Experience shows that even as income tax rates declined, 
taxpayers continued to seek aggressively structured planning opportunities to 
avoid or decrease the tax. So-called  ‘ son of boss ’ structures in the US avoided the 
federal income tax largely on low rate long term capital gain then capped at 15 or 
20 per cent. 43 Similarly, the S corporation payroll tax shelter avoided at most a 2.9 
per cent combined employer-employee payroll tax. 44
 Expatriation to avoid very high taxes long has been a matter of concern in 
high marginal rate jurisdictions having territorial income tax systems. 45 Some 
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46  Sweden, for example: 3. Kap. 3  § 3., 7  § Inkomstskattelag (1999:1229) (Income Tax Law Sweden), 
available at  https://lagen.nu/1999:1229 (accessed 3 October 2019) (taxing expatriates on their income 
from all sources (obegr ä nsad skattskyldighet) for  ve years following expatriation if they continue to 
have substantial connection with Sweden). 
47  Alstads æ ter, Johannesen and Zucman (n 40). 
48  Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service,  ‘ Quarterly Publication of Individuals, Who 
Have Chosen To Expatriate, as Required by Section 6039G ’ (1st quarter, 2019), 84 FR 20954 (13 May 
2019) (showing 1019 individuals). 
49  OECD Tax Database, available at  http://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/tax-database.htm#pit 
(accessed 3 October 2019). 
50  Ordower (n 26). 
51  OECD Tax Database (n 49). 
52  IRC  § 1(h) (net capital gain taxed at a maximum 20% marginal rate). As late as 1989, Sweden ’ s 
maximum marginal rate of income tax was approximately 80%. Sweden now imposes a  at rate of 30% 
on income from capital but a maximum rate on income from labour of approximately 55%  – with some 
variation a function of the local income tax. Sven-Olof Lodin et al,  Inkomstskatt  – en l ä ro- och handbok 
i skatter ä tt (Lund, Studentlitteratur, 2011). 
53  IRC  § 1(h)(10) (quali ed dividend preference in the US); dual income tax with a 30% rate on 
income from capital in Sweden. 
54  In 2018, the corporate income tax rate declined from a maximum of 35 to a  at 21% rate. IRC  § 11. 
55  E ective in 2018, quali ed business income yields a 20% deduction so only 80% of quali ed busi-
ness income is taxable. IRC  § 199A. 
countries address part of the impact of expatriation with continuation taxes, 46
but those anti-avoidance limitations on expatriation to avoid tax are an imperfect 
solution. Decreasing marginal rates of income tax and repeal or reduction in taxes 
at death has not staunched the  ow of capital to low tax jurisdictions 47 or expatria-
tions from the US and other countries. 48 Improved communication technology 
and stable, safe residential environments in many low-tax or no-tax island juris-
dictions enable US and European nationals to emigrate without losing contract or 
control over businesses operating in their home countries. 
 Nevertheless, as global competition for capital increased in the latter decades 
of the twentieth century, the steeply progressive income taxes with high maxi-
mum rates of tax characteristic of developed countries during the middle years 
of the twentieth century yielded to systems with moderate or  at progression and 
moderate maximum rates of tax. 49 Schedularity under income tax systems has 
increased with its nearly discrete tax bases to which di ering tax rate schedules 
apply. 50 Under schedularity, taxes have tended to increase on less mobile income 
from labour and to decrease on more mobile income from property. 51 As VAT 
rates and wage taxes on labour increased, taxes on capital gain stabilised or became 
preferential; 52 taxes on income from capital, as opposed to gain on the apprecia-
tion in the value of capital, also enjoyed a preference in some instances; 53 and rates 
of tax on corporations declined and continue to decline. 54 Recently the US enacted 
a preferential schedule for income from the conduct of businesses, other than the 
business of an employee, through a 20 per cent deduction of the amount of income 
from the business. 55  e new deduction favours capital intensive businesses and 
would seem to violate the horizontal equity principle. Periodic wealth taxes and 
gi  and estate taxes on the transmission of wealth similarly have declined or 
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56  In 1976 estates in excess of  $ 600,000 were subject to estate tax in the US, but in 2019 estates become 
taxable only in excess of  $ 11.4 million. IRC  § 2010 (exemption from tax).  e maximum estate tax rate 
in the US declined from 77% of taxable estates in excess of  $ 10 million in 1976 to 40% of taxable estates 
in excess of  $ 11 million. IRC  § 2001. Sweden repealed its inheritance tax in early 2005, retroactively to 
17 December 2004, and its wealth tax in December 2007, retroactively to 1 January 2007. Sweden and 
Austria are unusual among OECD members in not having an inheritance or estate tax. 
57  See text at nn 40 – 45, above. 
58  Lodin (n 34). 
59  Blum and Kalven (n 30) 487. 
60  AW  Mellon ,  Taxation:  e People ’ s Business ( London ,  Macmillan ,  1924 )  56 – 58 . 
61  IRC  § 877. 
62  IRC  § 877A. 
63  H  Ordower ,  ‘  e Expatriation Tax, Deferrals, Mark to Market, the  Macomber Conundrum and 
Doubtful Constitutionality ’ ( 2017 )  15  Pittsburgh Tax Review  1 , 7. Sweden ’ s continuation tax(n 46), 
in addition to taxing income from all sources for 5 years (obegr ä nsat skattskyldighet), also imposes 
limited tax liability of some expatriates on income from capital (begr ä nsat skattskyldighet) for 10 
years following change of residence. 3 ch. 19  § Inkomstskattelag (Svensk f ӧ rfattningssamling [SFS] 
1999:1229) (Swed.) (taxing Swedish citizens and permanent residents who leave Sweden on income 
from capital). Similarly, Germany has a 10-year continuation tax based on tax avoidance intent as 
described in  D  Gutmann ,  ‘ La lutte contre  “ l ’ exil  scal ” : du droit compar é  à la politique  scale ’,  Le Cercle 
des  scalistes ( 24 May 2012 ) , available at  http://www.lecercledes scalistes.com/publication/la-lutte-
contre-lexil- scal-du-droit-compare-a-la-politique- scale/234 (accessed 6 June 2019). 
disappeared. 56 Such changes in rates and schedular tax structures may discour-
age wealthy individuals from emigrating and settling in lower taxed countries or 
transferring their income producing personal property to low tax jurisdictions but 
the success of such tax reductions is not at all certain. 57
 Decline in maximum rates of tax and occasionally complete disappearance of 
taxes on transmission of wealth have limited impact on funding of governmen-
tal services and public bene ts. While steeply progressive taxes are associated 
historically with public bene ts and welfare states, even con scatory taxes on the 
wealthiest residents are unlikely to yield su  cient revenue to maintain extensive 
governmental functions and services. Moderate income taxpayers must provide 
the revenue to fund the demands of modern governments. 58  e policy support-
ing steeply progressive and high income tax rates and taxes on transmission of 
wealth at death served primarily to level disparities between wealthier and poorer 
residents and limit the growth and maintenance of a privileged and dominant 
class in the society. 59 Perceptions of worthiness of tax objects changed during the 
last decades of the twentieth century. Increasing capital mobility challenged the 
commonly held view that income from labour should not be disfavoured in taxa-
tion relative to income from capital. 60 Arguments prevailed that capital is more 
productive than labour so should be taxed at a lower rate than labour is taxed. 
 If decreased rates of tax and preferential tax treatment of capital gain and other 
income from capital do not constrain taxpayers from removing their capital from 
their home countries, exit taxes or continuation taxes following exit have become 
popular for the home country to capture otherwise lost future tax revenue.  e US 
has used both a continuation tax 61 and an exit tax. 62 A continuation tax imposes an 
obligation on the taxpayer to pay tax on some or all the taxpayer ’ s income follow-
ing change of residence or citizenship. 63 Most continuation taxes have limits on 
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64  IRC  § 877(d)(2). 
65  AG  Abreu ,  ‘ Taxing Exits ’ ( 1996 )  29  UC Davis Law Review  1087 (analysing various proposals to 
counteract the tax loss from expatriation with the income tax and the transfer tax systems). 
66  IRC  § 877A (expatriation tax).  e French expatriation tax Code g é n é ral des imp ô ts (Tax Code) 
art. 167a (Fr.) (as in e ect in 1999) was determined to violate the EU treaty when applied to a French 
national moving within the EU.  Case C-9/02  Hughes de Lasteyrie du Saillant v Minist è re de l ’ É conomie, 
des Finances et de l ’ Industrie [ 2004 ]  ECR I-2452 (European Court of Justice).  e French expatria-
tion tax was permissible, however, when a French national relocated to Switzerland.  Case C-355/16 
Christian Picart v Ministre des Finances et des Comptes publics ( 15 March 2018 ) in which the ECJ deter-
mined that the 1999 EU-Switzerland agreement on free movement of persons does not preclude France 
from imposing an exit tax on the unrealised gains of a taxpayer who moved to Switzerland but was not 
engaged in a trade or business there. 
67  Ordower (n 63) 6. 
68  IRC  § 865 (personal property sourced at residence). 
69  IRC  § 877A. 
70  Corporate residence for US tax purposes follows place of incorporation rather than seat of manage-
ment. IRC  § 7701(a)(4). 
71  IRC  § 61 (de ning gross income as all income from whatever source derived). Treasury reg  § 1.1-1 
(worldwide taxation). 
72  IRC  § 901 (foreign tax credit). 
duration, commonly  ve or 10 years.  e US tax had a 10-year durational limit. 64
An exit tax imposes a single incident of taxation on the taxpayer ’ s deferred income 
and unrealised gain at the moment of expatriation. 65 In the US payment of all or 
part of the tax may be deferred if the taxpayer assures payment of the tax through 
a bond or through withholding by the third party payer of the income to the 
taxpayer. 66
 Historically, US persons have valued their status as citizens and permanent 
residents of the US. Stable governments and developed banking and communi-
cation systems in low tax jurisdictions now make US citizenship or the right to 
reside permanently less compelling than they once were. Expatriation for wealthy 
individuals has become an alternative to continued citizenship or residence when 
it diminishes the individual ’ s tax burden substantially. 67 High net worth indi-
viduals ’ sources of income have globalised. US source income remains taxable in 
the US even a er expatriation but foreign source income ceases to be so. Some 
income follows the residence of its owner and becomes foreign source following 
expatriation. For example, unrealised gain on corporate stock, bonds, collectibles, 
gemstones, artwork and other personal property would have been US source if 
realised and recognised before a US person ’ s expatriation. If recognition is deferred 
until a er expatriation, its source shi s to the new residence of the owner 68 and it 
becomes free from US tax.  e expatriation tax is designed to capture the unreal-
ised appreciation as taxable gain to the date of expatriation. 69
  e US makes it more di  cult to shi  the incidence of taxation to low tax juris-
dictions than other countries with territorial systems do, because the US taxes its 
citizens, residents, and domestic corporations 70 on their income from all sources 
worldwide. 71 Despite worldwide taxation, the US generally cedes primary taxing 
jurisdiction for income produced outside the US to the country where the income 
is produced by crediting foreign taxes paid by the US person. 72 If the foreign taxes 
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73  IRC  § 904 (limitation to US tax on the income). 
74  ibid. 
75  IRC  § 877A (see text to nn 65 – 66). 
76  IRC  § 7345 (certi cation under section 32101 of the FAST Act, Pub L 114-94 (2015) enacted as a 
revenue o set). 
77  IRC  § 6851(d); IRS,  ‘ Departing Alien Clearance (Sailing Permit) ’, available at  https://www.irs.gov/
individuals/international-taxpayers/departing-alien-clearance-sailing-permit (accessed 3 October 
2019). 
78  Compare for Scandinavia, Alstads æ ter, Johannesen and Zucman (n 40). 
79  124 Stat 71, Pub L 97-117 (2010). 
80  IRC  § 1014. 
are less than the US tax on the income, the US captures a tax amount equal to the 
di erence between the higher US tax and the foreign tax credited. 73 If the foreign 
taxes are greater than the US tax, the credit may not exceed the amount of the US 
tax. 74
 To avoid US tax, US investors have two choices  – one lawful, one not.  ere 
are also opportunities to defer US tax on the increase in the value of the taxpayer ’ s 
investments.  e lawful choice is to relinquish US citizenship or, for non-citizen 
residents, the right to reside in the US.  at expatriation subjects the former US 
citizens and permanent residents to the expatriation tax. 75 Tax administration also 
has the power to certify seriously tax delinquent individuals to the Department of 
State for revocation or denial of issuance of the individual ’ s passport. 76 Tax clear-
ances are a requirement for non-residents exiting the US. 77
  e unlawful choice has been to secrete investments in foreign jurisdictions 
with strong bank secrecy laws so income and wealth remains hidden outside 
the US taxing jurisdiction, free from US tax. 78  e option of concealing income 
and income producing assets in a low tax, bank secrecy jurisdiction came under 
intense attack with the enactment of the Foreign Accounts Tax Compliance Act 
(FATCA) in 2010. 79  at legislation imposed substantial penalties on US taxpay-
ers who failed to disclose their foreign accounts and pay tax on their income from 
those accounts.  e Act also sanctioned foreign  nancial institutions accepting 
accounts from US taxpayers, which were not reported to US taxing authorities, by 
preventing them from participating in US programs, including reduced withhold-
ing on investments in the US  – a feature important to the institution ’ s underlying 
non-US investors. 
 Deferring US tax on increase in value is straightforward. Investors may oper-
ate businesses through or invest in domestic or foreign corporations and defer 
individual tax on the income until the individual shareholder receives distribu-
tions or sells the corporate shares. A peculiarity of the US tax system permanently 
eliminates the individual tax on gains but not dividends if the shareholder dies 
before selling the corporate shares as the decedent ’ s property receives a new, fair 
market value tax basis at the owner ’ s death. 80 A foreign corporation also permits 
the deferral of the US corporate-level income tax. Even if its shareholders are 
US persons, a foreign corporation is not subject to US taxing jurisdiction except 
on that portion of its income from US sources or e ectively connected with its 
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81  IRC  § 881 ( xed and determinable periodic income); IRC  § 882 (e ectively connected income). 
82  IRC  § 316 (de ning dividend as a distribution from any corporation ’ s earnings and pro ts); IRC 
 § 301 (including dividends in the shareholder ’ s income). 
83  Under IRC  § 951(b) (de ning United States (US) shareholder except under IRC  § 245A the distrib-
uting corporation need not be a controlled foreign corporation ( ‘ CFC ’ ). A CFC de ned in IRC  § 957 (e) 
is a corporation in which US shareholders own more than half the voting power and share value. 
84  IRC  § 245A (anti-avoidance rules limit the value of the exclusion). IRC  § 951A taxes returns in 
excess of 10% of a CFC ’ s tangible assets as subpart F income under the CFC provisions as global intangi-
ble income. IRC  § 59A imposes an additional base erosion alternative tax on related party transactions. 
85  IRC  § 951. 
86  Foreign base company income is subpart F income under IRC  § 952 included to the shareholders 
under IRC  § 951(a). IRC  § 954(a) (foreign base company income). 
87  IRC  § 951(a). Inclusion of CFC income is not fully transparent. Subpart F income that would have 
been capital gain to the corporation does not retain its character as capital gain to the US shareholders. 
88  IRC  § 1291 (income from a passive foreign investment company de ned in IRC  § 1297). A taxpayer 
may avoid the unfavourable e ect of these rules by electing to include the income of the foreign 
company in US income annually. IRC  § 1295 (quali ed electing fund); IRC  § 1293 (inclusion of pro rata 
share of quali ed electing fund income). 
89  IRC  § 1291(e). 
90  IRC  § 7874 (taxing all or part of a foreign entity ’ s income in the US either as if it were a US entity 
or under a continuation tax following expatriation of the entity). 
conduct of a US trade or business. 81 Most distributions of foreign source earnings 
of the foreign corporation to its non-corporate US owners become taxable in the 
US. 82 Since 2018, distributions of foreign source earnings to corporate sharehold-
ers that own at least 10 per cent of the voting rights in or the value of shares in the 
foreign corporation, that is, corporate US shareholders, 83 are free from US income 
tax on distributions from a foreign corporation under the 100 per cent dividends 
received deduction. 84
  e US has deployed an array of complex anti-avoidance or anti-deferral 
rules to prevent taxpayers from exploiting corporate limitations on US taxation 
of foreign source income. Some income of CFCs is taxable to the corporation ’ s 
US shareholders if the placement of foreign source income serves no non-tax 
business purpose. 85 Passive investment income as well as sales and service 
income unrelated to the CFC ’ s country of incorporation 86 trigger the inclu-
sion to the shareholders as if the CFC were a tax transparent entity similar to 
a partnership. 87 US persons who invest in foreign investment companies may 
defer inclusion of the foreign investment company ’ s income but when they sell 
their interests in the foreign company or receive distributions, the gain does not 
enjoy preferential rates on capital gains, and the gains and dividends become 
subject to an interest charge. 88 A decedent ’ s estate does not get a new basis in 
foreign investment company shares so the estate ’ s bene ciaries remain subject 
to the interest charge on the increase in value of the investment in the foreign 
investment company. 89 US corporations converting to foreign corporations 
to avoid US taxation on their foreign source income are caught by the anti-
inversion provisions 90 subjecting them to continuing taxation of their foreign 
source income in the US. 
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91  IRC  § 7701(b)(1)(B) (de ning nonresident alien as an individual neither a citizen nor resident of 
the US). 
92  IRC  § 1441 (withholding requirement). 
93  IRC  § 871 (tax on  xed, determinable, annual or periodic income of nonresident aliens); IRC  § 881 
(similarly, foreign corporations). 
94  For example, Art. X of the United States  – Canada Income Tax Convention, available at  https://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/canada.pdf (accessed 8 June 2019) reduces the withholding rate of dividends 
to 10% for certain corporate recipients and 15% for others. 
95  IRC  § 871(i). 
96  IRC  § § 871(h), 881(c). Portfolio interest is non-contingent interest paid pursuant to a registered 
debt instrument. 
97  H Ordower,  ‘ Les Imp ô ts Relatifs aux Investissements  É trangers aux  É tats-Unis d ’ Am é rique (obser-
vations g é n é rales) ’ (1996) 1996-2  Revue Internationale de Droit Economique 185. 
98  G Makhlouf,  ‘ Current Status of OECD ’ s Harmful Tax Practices Initiative A statement by the 
Chairman of the OECD ’ s Committee on Fiscal A airs ’ (2002), available at  http://www.oecd.org/
general/searchresults/?q=unfair%20tax%20competition&cx=012432601748511391518:xzeadub0b0a
&cof=FORID:11&ie=UTF-8 (accessed 8 June 2019). 
 IV. Investors and Investor Immigrants 
(Commodifying Immigration) 
 As the US and other countries seek to limit expatriation of revenue, capital and 
people to protect the domestic tax base, there is active competition among juris-
dictions, including the US, to attract cross-border capital and people.  e global 
competition for capital is powerful and possibly destructive when it becomes a 
 ‘ race to the bottom ’ of income inclusion and tax rates. 
  e US taxes the US-source investment income of non-resident alien individu-
als 91 and foreign corporations on its gross amount by requiring the person making 
any payment of US source income to a non-resident alien or foreign corporation 
to withhold 92 30 per cent of the gross payment. 93  e US competes for the foreign 
investment capital with double tax treaties that reduce that rate of tax on interest, 
dividends, royalties and other investment income 94 and with exemptions from the 
withholding tax for the interest paid on deposits in  nancial institutions 95 and on 
portfolio indebtedness. 96
 State and local governmental units o er a variety of direct and tax subsidies to 
induce the enterprises planning to operate in the US to choose a speci c locale. 
 e practice of tax subsidy competition has generated a robust bidding process 
among states and localities in the US with questionable returns to the locality in 
exchange for considerable loss of tax revenue.  e subsidies o en do not require 
a permanent commitment from the enterprise and occasionally leave the local-
ity with an ongoing facilities ’ burden a er the enterprise ceases its operations 
there. 97
 Some low tax jurisdictions have competed actively for investor capital by o er-
ing bank secrecy and low or no income tax on the earnings of non-residents. 
 e OECD targeted these jurisdictions as engaging in harmful tax practices in 
a 1998 initiative 98 leading to increased transparency and information sharing by 
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99  OECD,  Harmful Tax Practices  – 2018 Progress Report on Preferential Regimes; Inclusive Framework 
on BEPS: Action 5 , available at  https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/harmful-tax-practices-2018-progress-
report-on-preferential-regimes-9789264311480-en.htm (accessed 9 June 2019). 
100  OECD,  ‘ Base Erosion and Pro t Shi ing ’, available at  http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/ (accessed 3 
October 2019). 
101  C Yeginsu,  ‘ What Are Britain ’ s  “ Golden Visas, ” and Why Are  ey Being Suspended ? ’  New 
York Times (6 December 2018), available at  https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/06/world/europe/
uk-golden-visa-suspended.html (accessed 4 October 2019) (expressing concern about Russian 
oligarchs ’ use of the British programme for money laundering). 
102  Adim (n 38); Christians (n 38). 
103  Adim (n 38) 122. 
104  Christians (n 38) 57. 
105  Ibid, 51 (discussing Italy ’ s new programme, and comparison with Portugal, Malta, Ireland);  RA 
 Papotti and  L  Ferro ,  ‘ Italy ’ s Attractive New Tax Regime for Wealthy Pensioners ’  Tax Notes International
( 29 April 2019 )  343 . 
106  FATCA legislation in the US (n 79); harmful tax competition and BEPS initiatives of the OECD 
(nn 98 and 100). 
the targeted jurisdictions. 99 A second initiative on base erosion and pro t shi ing 
(BEPS) has continued the e ort to achieve greater transparency with uniformity in 
tax rules to prevent arbitrage especially through use of hybrid structures. 100
 Such international e orts to limit tax competition may have motivated inves-
tors to become immigrants seeking the most favourable living and investment 
bases rather than simply moving capital. An emerging international competi-
tion issue has focused on  ‘ golden ’ visas, including money laundering and similar 
concerns surrounding their issuance. 101 Rather than o ering tax or direct subsi-
dies for investment, countries with golden visa regimes expedite the immigration 
process for investors who bring substantial investment capital to the receiving 
country. 
 Under golden visa programmes, investor immigrants invest designated mini-
mal amounts in the receiving country in exchange for the privilege to enter and 
reside there. 102 Some Caribbean island states exchange immediate citizenship 
for a fee rather than an investment commitment. 103  e amounts and indus-
tries in which the investments must be made are not uniform among countries. 
Economically developed countries like the US require a larger investment 
commitment than do countries looking to capture international capital to assist 
the country ’ s lagging economic development. 104 Several countries also provide 
investor immigrants with temporarily favoured tax treatment. 105 Others are low 
tax jurisdictions that welcome investors from high tax jurisdictions who may wish 
to avoid or evade taxes in their home countries by changing their residence or 
citizenship. 106 Investor immigrants are desired and desirable as they add capital to 
the receiving country ’ s economy. 
 Investor immigrants to the US are subject to general US taxing jurisdic-
tion under the US worldwide taxation system when they become US residents. 
 eir foreign source income draws a credit for taxes paid to foreign jurisdic-
tions. Immigration for tax reasons is practical only for investors subject to taxes 
equal to or higher than US taxes in the country from which they are emigrating. 
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107  Generally n 39 (text accompanying and following). 
108  IRC  § 3101 (6.2% tax on wages); IRC  § 1401 (tax on self-employment income). 
109  IRC  § 1(h) (maximum rate on net capital gains and dividends). 
110  IRC  § 1001 (gain from sale or other disposition of property). 
111  IRC  § 168(k) (bonus depreciation). 
112  IRC  § 199A (n 55 and accompanying text). 
113  For example, USCIS,  ‘ H-1B Specialty Occupations ’, available at  https://www.uscis.gov/
working-united-states/temporary-workers/h-1b-specialty-occupations-dod-cooperative-research-
and-development-project-workers-and-fashion-models (accessed 4 October 2019). 
114  IRC  § 199A (n 55 and accompanying text) (quali ed business income). 
115  IRC  § 3101. In 2019, wages in excess of  $ 132,900 are free from the social security tax.  ‘ Social Security 
Fact Sheet 2019 Social Security Changes ’, available at  https://www.ssa.gov/news/press/factsheets/cola-
facts2019.pdf (accessed 9 June 2019).  ose who never become permanent residents are unlikely to 
draw any bene ts under the social security system. 
116  H1-B visas are dual purpose and permit application for green cards while other temporary work 
visas do not (text to n 113, above). 
117  nn 125 – 126, below, and accompanying text. 
Where their emigration jurisdiction has lower taxes than the US, investor visas 
are desirable only from non-tax perspectives  – opportunities, lifestyle, safety, etc. 
As investors they enjoy the tax advantages currently favouring capital over labour 
in the US, 107 including the absence of any social security tax on income from 
capital, 108 preferential rates for net capital gain and dividends, 109 deferral of inclu-
sion in income of appreciation in the value of their property, 110 rapid tax recovery 
of many capital expenditures, 111 and a deduction of 20 per cent of the income from 
the conduct of a trade or business in the US. 112
 V. Educated and Skilled Labour 
 A. Skilled Immigrants 
 Countries also tend to welcome immigrants or temporary workers with speci c 
skills in a variety of  elds.  e US has many immigration priority programs for 
educated and skilled workers. 113 Jobs for individuals with skills or training o en 
pay better than jobs in the immigrant ’ s country of origin. Like investor immi-
grants, skilled immigrants are subject to the general taxing jurisdiction of the 
US on their worldwide income. Unlike investor immigrants, skilled immigrants 
receive payment for services and do not enjoy the advantages of the current US 
preferences for income from capital. Since their visa status is employment depend-
ent, they may not conduct an independent trade or business yielding the quali ed 
business income deduction. 114  ey must pay social security taxes but those with 
high demand skills may draw wages exceeding the social security earnings cap 
so only part of their wages are subject to the social security tax. 115 Some skilled 
employee visas permit conversion to permanent residence 116 and access to social 
security bene ts at retirement age unavailable to other temporary workers who 
may not work in the US su  ciently long to qualify for bene ts. 117 Employers also 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3745996
148 Henry Ordower
118  IRC  § 119 (exclusion from gross income of meals and lodging provided for the convenience of the 
employer). 
119  US  Army ,  ‘ Earn Your Degree  rough ROTC ’, available at  https://www.goarmy.com/bene ts/
education-bene ts/earn-your-degree-through-rotc.html (accessed  18 September 2019 ) (example of 
US service commitment military education programmes). 
120  T  Boeri ,  H  Brucker ,  F  Doquier and  H  Rapoport (eds),  Brain Drain and Brain Gain  e Global 
Competition to Attract High-Skilled Migrants ( Oxford ,  OUP ,  2012 ) ;  G  Block and  M  Blake ,  Debating 
Brain Drain: May Governments Restrict Emigration ? ( Oxford ,  OUP ,  2015 ) ; and literature cited at n 18, 
above. 
121  nn 113 – 120 above, and accompanying text. 
may o er various deferred compensation arrangements and, for some occupa-
tions, provide non-taxable bene ts including housing and meals. 118 High wages 
may give the workers the opportunity to accumulate disposable income for invest-
ment to capture capital taxation bene ts as investor immigrants do. 
 B. Skilled Emigrants 
 Economically developing countries educate promising young citizens at govern-
ment expense to develop an indigenous pool of skilled and educated workers.  ose 
individuals are among the most desired candidates for immigration to economi-
cally developed countries where their skills also are needed. Salaries higher than 
those possible in their home country and better opportunities for family members 
are seductive, despite any privileges their education might a ord them at home. 
Emigration thwarts the home country ’ s plans for those individuals to ful l impor-
tant societal roles and advance the country ’ s development. Prohibiting emigration 
provides a solution but raises human rights concerns.  ese privileged individu-
als consumed considerable amounts from limited national wealth to become who 
they are. Repayment in some manner may be appropriate. 119 Other countries 
impose a special fee or tax requiring an emigrant to repay all or part of the cost 
or value of the education or training as an exit tax or a continuation tax following 
emigration. 120
 VI. Fungible Labour: Authorised and 
Unauthorised Immigrants 
 Many jobs require limited skills and training.  e workers doing the jobs are 
substantially fungible. While unskilled jobs require some training  – even special-
ised training in many instances  – the necessary skills are relatively easy to learn 
and the shi  from one unskilled job to another carries a moderate or low retrain-
ing cost. Unlike skilled and educated workers, 121 fungible workers receive limited 
amounts of nontaxable fringe bene ts. Most fungible workers are subject to wage 
taxes on all their income because they do not earn more than the social security 
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tax ceiling.  ey spend the bulk of their income on necessaries, leaving them little 
opportunity to accumulate wealth. In countries with VAT, substantially all of a 
fungible worker ’ s income is subject to VAT as well as wage taxes. Fungible workers 
constitute much of the taxpaying public, bear a considerable portion of the burden 
of paying for government, 122 and are a ected most profoundly as tax burdens shi  
from capital to labour. 
 Included in the pool of fungible labour are many immigrants who are low 
wage workers invited  – sometimes temporarily as guest workers, sometimes as 
immigrants  – to  ll labour shortages.  ey are the Chinese labourers who built the 
US transcontinental railway; 123 the Mexicans, Central Americans and Filipinos 
who harvest crops; the Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Caribbean islanders 
and Central Americans who provide cleaning services and home care for children, 
the elderly and individuals with disabilities. Some immigrate with the receiving 
government ’ s authorisation and permission to work temporarily 124 or perma-
nently, but many others enter without authorisation or with authorisation that 
does not permit them to work. 
 Once immigrants, whether temporary or permanent, reside in the US, their 
incomes become subject to the income tax and their wages to social security and 
Medicare taxes, although many will not reside in the US for the 10 years necessary 
to become eligible for retirement bene ts under social security. 125 Many tempo-
rary workers and some immigrants who later reside outside the US lose bene ts 
a er six months outside the US. 126 Anyone buying items in the US pays state and 
local sales and use taxes even if the items are necessities for living. States vary with 
respect to items they may exempt from the state sales tax. 127
 In the US low wage earners qualify for a negative income tax 128 on their labour 
income. 129  e credit is substantial 130 but as the taxpayer ’ s income increases, the 
credit rapidly phases out. 131  e credit does not help unemployed individuals 
and the phase out e ectively imposes an additional 21 per cent tax on increases 
in wages in the phase-out range. Taxpayers lose the credit if they have income 
122  n 34 above, and accompanying text .
123  n 16, above, and accompanying text. 
124  USCIS ,  ‘ H-2A, B temporary workers ’, available at  https://www.uscis.gov/working-united-states/
temporary-nonimmigrant-workers (accessed  18 September 2019 ) . 
125  Social Security Administration ,  ‘ Retirement Bene ts ’, available at  https://www.ssa.gov/pubs/
EN-05-10035.pdf (accessed  10 June 2019 ) . 
126  20 CFR  §  404.460 (nonpayment of monthly bene ts to aliens outside the United States). 
127  For example,  New York State Department of Taxation and Finance ,  ‘ Lists of Exempt and Taxable 
Clothing, Footwear, and Items Used to Make or Repair Exempt Clothing ’,  Tax Bulletin ST-530 
(TB-ST-530) ( 10 March 2014 ) , available at  https://www.tax.ny.gov/pubs_and_bulls/tg_bulletins/st/
clothing_chart.htm (accessed 10 June 2019). 
128  IRC  § 32 (in ation adjusted, refundable credit designed originally to balance the social security 
tax). 
129  IRC  § 32(c)(2) (wages plus self-employment income). 
130  IRC  § 32(b) (as much as 45% of the taxpayer ’ s earned income not exceeding  $ 14,570 in 2019 if the 
taxpayer has three or more qualifying children). 
131  ibid.  e phase-out is 21.06% of each dollar over  $ 24,820 for married taxpayers  ling jointly: Rev 
Proc 2018-57, 2018-49 IRB 19 (phase-out tables). 
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from capital exceeding a low threshold, thus discouraging any accumulation of 
wealth by low income individuals. 132 Fear of examination by the taxing authority 
may discourage taxpayers from claiming the credit since taxpayers claiming the 
credit are examined more frequently than taxpayers with much greater incomes. 133
Taxpayers who do not have social security numbers are ineligible for the credit 
even if they have alternate taxpayer identi cation 134 and meet the other quali ca-
tions for the credit. Unauthorised workers may pay social security and income 
taxes but may not claim the earned income credit. 135
 Unauthorised immigrants are subject to deportation and have little hope of 
gaining authorised status. Unless they secure false papers or alternative taxpayer 
identi cation, 136 unauthorised immigrants may not accept work in the formal 
economy of the country.  ey participate primarily in the informal economy in 
which they receive payment for their services or the goods they sell in cash or in 
barter goods and services. Generally they accept payments for their services at 
rates substantially below the formal economy market rate. 137 Such service value 
discounts are necessary to entice service recipients to use unauthorised workers ’ 
services rather than those o ered in the formal market. Unauthorised workers 
frequently  nd employment in occupations in which supplies of authorised work-
ers are inadequate or that authorised workers do not want. Many unauthorised 
workers are in household occupations where their employer is in need of the 
services but is unwilling or unable to pay formal market rates.  e payments gener-
ally would yield no tax deduction for the employer so payments in cash outside the 
formal economy are not of any consequence to the employers. 138 Even when they 
might provide a tax bene t to the employer, 139 the wages may be su  ciently low 
that the tax bene t would not match the wage di erential for authorised workers. 
 Many unauthorised workers without tax identi cation do not report their 
income for income tax purposes. Failure to report income poses risks of both 
civil and criminal penalties since their obligation to report and pay taxes is 
132  IRC  § 32(i)(2); Rev Proc 2018-57 (n 131) (threshold amount in 2019 is  $ 3,600). 
133  P  Kiel ,  J  Eisinger , and  Propublica ,  ‘  e Golden Age of Rich People Not Paying  eir Taxes ’,   e 
Atlantic ( 11 December 2018 ), available at  https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/12/rich-
people-are-getting-away-not-paying-their-taxes/577798/ (accessed  4 October 2019 ) . 
134   e US issues individual taxpayer identi cation numbers (ITIN) on request to individuals not 
authorised to work in the US but who have income to report in the US. IRS,  ‘ Instructions for Form 
W-7 ’, available at  https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/iw7.pdf (accessed 4 October 2019). 
135  In some cases they may claim the child tax credit under IRC  § 24 because the child is a citizen of 
the US by birth in the US and has a social security number. 
136  US taxpayer identi cation, for example (see n 134). 
137   e informal (or underground economy) operates primarily in cash outside the banking system 
and government regulation. Workers are paid at below market rates and have no little or no job protec-
tion. International Labour Organization,  ‘ More than 60 per cent of the world ’ s employed population are 
in the informal economy ’ (8 April 2018), available at  https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/news-
room/news/WCMS_627189/lang--en/index.htm (accessed 4 October 2019). 
138  Homecare workers for children, in rm and aged individuals, for example, generally non-
deductible in any event as a personal expense under IRC  § 262 or the low wages in the informal 
economy being more valuable than a tax credit in those instances in which a credit is available. IRC  § 21. 
139  IRC  § 21 (dependent care expense credit, for example). 
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independent of immigration status. If they were authorised workers, the incomes 
of many would lie below the threshold at which an income tax otherwise might 
be payable 140 but, in most instances, a wage-based social security tax would be 
payable. In the US such low income workers if authorised to work in the US might 
qualify for the earned income credit. 141  us, they are disadvantaged relative to 
authorised workers both in wage levels and access to a low wage tax bene t. While 
many unauthorised immigrants may not pay an income tax, they do pay consump-
tion taxes 142 and excise taxes as they consume and indirectly pay property taxes in 
their housing rent. 143
 VII. Conclusion 
 Taxation plays a role in immigration and emigration and seems to drive some 
decisions to migrate from high to low tax jurisdictions. Capital mobility and 
labour immobility argue in favour of decreasing taxes on capital to prevent capital 
 ight even if the decrease means shi ing tax burdens to labour. Decreased taxes on 
capital, however, do not guarantee that capital will not  ee. Another jurisdiction 
may o er still lower taxes and generate conditions for tax decrease competition, 
depriving the taxing jurisdiction of needed revenue. A race to the bottom on capi-
tal taxes enhances disparities between wealthy and poor residents and is unlikely 
to bene t developed economies. Growth of a privileged class undercuts longstand-
ing commitments in advanced democracies to equality and equal opportunity. 
 Uncertainty for fungible, immigrant workers, both authorised and unauthor-
ised, as to whether they will be permitted to remain in the country to which they 
have migrated o en leaves them targets for exploitation.  e immigrants accept 
low wages with few opportunities to organise to demand fairer wage treatment. 
Withholding to pay income and social security taxes from which they are unlikely 
to bene t further reduces already low wage income. Anti-immigrant government 
policies amplify uncertainty for fungible, immigrant workers and further exert 
downward pressure on wages assisting American business in keeping wages low 
and enhancing pro tability. 
 Ability to pay  – vertical equity  – as a fundamental principle of taxation and 
resulting redistribution of wealth through strong welfare systems that provide for 
140   e income tax system of each developed economy does not tax incomes that fall below a mini-
mum amount.  at amount di ers from country to country. In the US, the standard deduction under 
IRC  § 63 currently is  $ 12,000 so that incomes less than that amount are not taxable. In Germany, a 
subsistence minimum must remain free from the income tax under the Constitutional Court ’ s decision 
BVerfGE 82, 60, 85 (29 Mai 1990, 1st Senat). 
141  IRC  § 32 (n 128 above, and accompanying text). 
142   e US has no national consumption tax but most of the states of the US have retail sales taxes. 
143  A  Stevenson ( A  Jurow Kleiman ),  ‘ Improving the US Guest Worker System through Tax and Social 
Welfare Reform ’ ( 2014 )  17  Harvard Latino Law Review  147 (providing an excellent discussion of these 
issues). 
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the needs of all remain as compelling today as they were when many economically 
developed countries chose to impose steeply progressive taxes. Yet the focus on 
competing for capital resources seems to have supplanted principles of fairness 
and ability to pay and resulted in increasingly  at or regressive taxation. Tax rate 
competition for capital seems a doubtful strategy heading toward a zero tax on 
capital income and raises the question of whether something else  – immigrant 
exploitation, wealth-based power disparities  – motivates countries to shi  tax 
burdens from capital to labour. 
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